The Deification of Political Opinion

Ta-Nehisi Coates at The Atlantic is discussing the legacy of Christopher Hitchens and the reactions to his death by various commentators, including discussion of whether "not speaking ill of the dead" should apply to public figures. I was struck by this quote of a quote:

As Cook put it: "it must not be forgotten in mourning him that he got the single most consequential decision in his life horrifically, petulantly wrong"

Is this someone being rather hard on Hitchen's strident atheism, which went to extremes such as loudly mocking Mother Teresa and her work in the most excessive and vulgar terms? Is some health nut going after his heavy smoking and binge drinking? Is some woman upset by the way his literary bad boy persona spilled over into his relationships? No, the topic is Hitchen's opinion on the Iraq War:

indeed: "People make mistakes. What's horrible about Hitchens' ardor for the invasion of Iraq is that he clung to it long after it became clear that a grotesque error had been made..."

I could see someone arguing that the Iraq War was the "single most consequential decision" in President Bush's life, or Dick Cheney's life, or even that of some major military figure. But Hitchen's was a literary and opinion journalist. That his thoughts on the Iraq War could somehow end up being the most "consequential" in his life suggests a view in which simply having a political opinion on some issue of the day is more important in one's life than anything one actually does.

This seems like an increasingly common way of thinking. As people decide that they are "basically good people" and banish morality from the bedroom, the living room, and the board room, they come to see morality as being the alignment with larger groups on the big issues of the day. Only the scrupulous worry about the morality of the mundane. Instead, morality is determined by how one addresses the big capitalized phrases of the moment: the War on Terror, Poverty, Inequality, Gay Rights, the Environment, etc.

This, it seems to me, couldn't be more backwards. Sure, what one thinks on various matters of the day is indicative of one's moral and personal choices, but the most consequential decisions of our lives are those we make about how we treat those around us on a day in and day out basis -- and whether we accept as the ruler and guide of those decisions our Maker.

Proxy Morality: Advocacy and 'Solidarity'

A couple weeks ago, I wrote a post on how we sometimes impute excessive virtue to ourselves for being on the right side of historical conflicts, though a sort of proxy morality. I'd like to follow-up on the theme with the other area in which I think we often fall into a mentality of proxy morality: issue advocacy and solidarity with oppressed groups.

Let me start by trying to lay out a little bit more clearly what I think proxy morality is and why I think it is a danger to us. Proxy morality consists of drawing a strong sense of virtue or righteousness from identification with some cause or group. It is, I think, a dangerous tendency because it allows us to indulge in a great deal of pride and righteousness, while at the same time running of the risk of both excusing ourselves from taking any direct moral action in regards to the issues which we congratulate ourselves on due to proxy morality. It also presents the temptation of telling ourselves, "I'm a basically good person because of my support for X, Y, Z, and thus my minor failings A, B and C hardly matter." Indeed, more generally, I think there is always a big of backslapping going on between Screwtape and his associates when one of us self-awards the "basically good person" label.

One area in which I think we often develop a sense of proxy morality is in regards to advocacy -- often political advocacy. For those of us on the right, this may be in regards to opposing abortion, same sex marriage, euthenasia, and other clear social evils in the voting booth. This is clearly a good thing, and I think there is often significant moral wrong in not opposing these evils. However, casting a ballot or publicaly agreeing with a political stance is something that typically costs us very little at a personal level, and does little if anything to help specific other human beings. So while it would certainly be wrong if we didn't oppose these evils, it is dangerous if we give ourselves too much credit for doing so. As the Chris Rock line goes, "What? You want a cookie? You're supposed to do that!" For those of a more progressive persuasion, a similar sense of proxy morality is often felt by those supporting environmental regulations or programs intended to reduce poverty, etc. Leaving aside questions about whether such measures are successful in achieving their objectives, it must at the least be admitted that casting a vote or engaging in advocacy has significantly less impact on these matters of concern than actually living a "greener" life or doing something yourself to help those in proverty.

A related area of proxy morality is declaring oneself to be "in solidarity" with some particular group recognized to be suffering. If one is actually out living in Neuvo Laredo or Juarez and helping those suffering there, one can make some legitimate claim to be "in solidarity with the poor" -- if on the other hand one simply means, "I really feel for the poor from the safety of my computer desk, unlike those nasty people who clearly don't," then one is engaging in proxy morality.

Similarly, declaring oneself to be "supporting" women in crisis pregnancies or women oppressed by traditional Islamic cultures is a rather empty boast if it is unaccompanied by any particular action (other than talking about it) and should be no great source of feeling virtuous.

Again, I do not want to imply that people should not take these stands or have these sympathies. Doing the opposite (opposing good policies or not sympathizing with those who are suffing) would clearly be bad. However, we accomplish very little actual virtue by taking these stands and we should never allow ourselves to believe that once we have done so our work is done.

Proxy Morality: Taking Sides in History

Generally speaking, I think we would say that moral behavior consists of choosing to do right in one's actions. However, there are a number of instances in which we tend to think of ourselves as behaving virtuously despite not having actually undertaken any action. These are means by which we tell ourselves that we have demonstrated we are "good people" without the burden of actually doing good things.

There are several different ways we do this which I'd like to address under the description of "proxy morality", by which I mean instances in which someone assigns virtue to himself through no more action than identifying himself with some good which is performed by someone else. The first of these, one which I think people of all ideological persuasions fall into at times, is that of taking sides in history.

It is by now an old saw that those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it, and I think there is a good deal of truth in this. Further, it can be of some moral benefit for us to look to history for people and actions to admire. The moment in which we find ourselves suddenly faced with some difficult moral decision is typically not the moment at which are most un-biased or deliberative, and so having clear examples to follow, if they are well chosen, can be a significant benefit.

However, all too often, we assign too much virtue to being "on the right side" of a historical event. Sometimes this happens very shortly after an event. In post-war France, it was often observed that if everyone who claimed to have been part of the resistance had actually been so, the occupation would not have lasted a month. Similarly, I recall reading a civil rights writer observe, "Every [African American] says he would have been a freedom rider. Most people just stayed home. Everyone says he would have marched with Martin Luther King, but people just used the water fountain they were told and watched it on TV."

The fact of the matter is, identifying the right side of history is easy -- indeed so easy that it's easier if one doesn't actually know much about history. So easy that there is virtually no moral action involved.

To be sure, choosing the wrong side of history can be a significant moral wrong. To support the Nazis or support slavery or support Stalin in this day and age shows a deeply twisted moral sense. But to oppose these three is so easy, and so obvious, from this point in history, that there is little to no virtue involved.

To congratulate oneself for admiring the right side of history is to assign oneself virtue one has not earned. Indeed, it is often more a sign of pride than of virtue. Without question, we should admire those in history who acted virtuously, but we should not consider ourselves to have performed any great virtue by doing so. Nor should we be quick to consider ourselves the superiors of those "ordinary people" in history who failed to rise to the standards of our heroes. We look at their actions with all of the clarity of distance, and none of the danger of immediacy.